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Battle_03_2_SummaryDiscussions

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 22:44:50 GMT

Battle_03_1_4talks

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 22:39:23 GMT

Battle_02_3_Language

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 22:39:23 GMT

Battle_02_2_Maxine

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 22:00:30 GMT

Battle_02_1_Mirror_Neurons

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 22:00:30 GMT

Battle_01_5_Claire

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 21:16:06 GMT

Battle_01_4_Hanne

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 21:16:06 GMT

Battle_01_3_Charles_Lenay

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 21:16:06 GMT

Battle_01_1_Introduction

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 20:21:12 GMT

Battle 08 Workshop. 1 Introduction

Battle_01_2_Participants

Thu, 04 Sep 2008 19:43:40 GMT

Battle 08 Workshop. Day 1. File 2. Participants

The Myth of the Inner, the Myth of the Hidden

Thu, 05 Jun 2008 09:49:26 GMT

This is a recording of Life and Mind seminar #37, given by Steve Torrance on 4th of June 2008.

LifeAndMind-Feb-14-2008

Fri, 15 Feb 2008 12:42:39 GMT

"How Enactivism relates to Reflexive Monism"
by Max Velmans

Dualists believe that experiences have neither location nor extension, while reductive and ‘non-reductive’ physicalists (biological naturalists) believe that experiences are really in the brain, producing an apparent impasse in current theories of mind. Enactive and reflexive models of perception try to resolve this impasse with a form of “externalism” that challenges the assumption that experiences must either be nowhere or in the brain. However, they are externalist in very different ways. Insofar as they locate experiences anywhere, enactive models locate conscious phenomenology in the dynamic interaction of organisms with the external world, and in some versions, they reduce conscious phenomenology to such interactions, in the hope that this will resolve the “hard” problems of consciousness. The reflexive model accepts that experiences of the world result from dynamic organism-environment interactions, but argues that such interactions are preconscious. While the resulting phenomenal world is a consequence of such interactions, it cannot be reduced to them. The reflexive model is externalist in its claim that this external phenomenal world, which we normally think of as the “physical world,” is literally outside the brain. Furthermore, there are no added conscious experiences of the external world inside the brain. In closing the gap between the phenomenal world and what we normally think of as the physical world, the reflexive model of perception and the broader reflexive monism it supports provide a different approach to the hard problems of consciousness. Conversely, while enactive models have useful things to say about percept formation and representation, they fail to address the hard problems of consciousness.

Toward a Phenomenological Pragmatics of Enactive Perception

Thu, 29 Nov 2007 16:52:22 GMT

Toward a Phenomenological Pragmatics of Enactive Perception

Froese & Spiers (2007)

The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become skillful in the use of PS devices themselves. The ‘Enactive Torch’ is proposed as an experimental platform which is cheap, non-intrusive and easy to replicate, so as to enable researchers to corroborate reported experiences with their own phenomenology more easily.

Presented at the 4th Int. Conf. on Enactive Interfaces, (Enactive/07), 19-22 Nov. 2007, Grenoble, France.

LifeAndMind-Nov-14-Froese

Mon, 19 Nov 2007 10:50:26 GMT

The enactive approach to perception is generating an extensive amount of interest and debate in the cognitive sciences. One particularly contentious issue has been how best to characterize the perceptual experiences reported by subjects who have mastered the skillful use of a perceptual supplementation (PS) device. This paper argues that this issue cannot be resolved with the use of third-person methodologies alone, but that it requires the development of a phenomenological pragmatics. In particular, it is necessary that the experimenters become skillful in the use of PS devices themselves. The ‘Enactive Torch’ is proposed as an experimental platform which is cheap, non-intrusive and easy to replicate, so as to enable researchers to corroborate reported experiences with their own phenomenology more easily.

LifeAndMind-Oct-31-Virgo-McGregor

Thu, 01 Nov 2007 14:59:36 GMT

IT’S ALIVE!!! (Sort of.) We propose that dissipative structures and the production of entropy should be part of the A-Life research
programme, explaining why lifelike properties like self-maintenance are common in the inanimate world and deserve our attention. Examples such as hurricanes, candle flames and photocopiers are even closer to living organisms than they appear on first inspection, and they are easier to study. Inspired by the theory of autopoiesis we’ll suggest that studying these kinds of physical phenomena can give us insight into the dynamics of self-maintenance in living organisms and help us explore its relationship to cognition. We’ll display some cool simulations exploring the behaviour of some simple dissipative systems and showing just how lifelike they can be.

LifeAndMind-Oct-17-DiPaolo

Thu, 18 Oct 2007 10:55:41 GMT

Ezequiel Di Paolo's talk: "Exploring the continuity between life and mind: or more ways to upset a closet cognitivist"